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Weeden: Protecting the President's Limited Expectation of Privacy

PROTECTING THE PRESIDENT'S LIMITED
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DURING AN
INVESTIGATION MAY JUSTIFY THE PROTECTIVE
FUNCTION PRIVILEGE FOR THE SECRET
SERVICE
L. Darnell Weeden*

I. INTRODUCTION

The issue addressed in this article is whether members of
the United States Secret Service, while acting in their official
capacity of protecting the president, should be granted a
protective function privilege against testifying about
observations made of the president's private activities. In the
recent In re Grand Jury Proceedings,' the Secret Service
requested a federal district court to grant it a protective function
privilege. The privilege would have permitted Secret Service
agents the right to refuse to answer certain questions during
depositions conducted by the Office of Independent Counsel
(OIC).2 Although the district court characterized the protective
function privilege as a "novel one," 3 a theory for the concept may
4
be found under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

. Interim Dean & Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern
University; B.A.; J.D., University of Mississippi. I would like to thank Roslyn Y.
Bazzelle, Student Research Assistant at Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Class of
1999, for her valuable comments concerning earlier drafts of this article.
1. No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998).
2. See id. at *1.
3. Id.
4. FED. R. EvID. 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State Law.
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A federal court, in fact, has the discretion to create new
privileges under Rule 501. The United States Supreme Court
has held, however, that these privileges "are not lightly created
nor expansively construed." 5 Prior to a court creating a new
privilege under Rule 501, the Supreme Court asks courts to
consider (1) whether the proposed privilege has a historical basis
in federal law, (2) if any state has recognized the proposed
privilege, and (3) the public policy interest served by the
6
proposed privilege.
Because of the unique role of the president in our federal
government, it would be difficult to recognize a protective
function privilege that is based on federal legal history and
widespread state support.
Public policy considerations,
however, may weigh strongly in favor of either a federal court or
Congress recognizing the protective function privilege in order to
establish the institution of presidential privacy. Even so, some
federal courts have taken the position that the Supreme Court is
"willing to recognize a new privilege only when the privilege had
some history in federal law and enjoyed broad state support, and
public policy considerations weighed strongly in favor of
recognizing it."7

The protective function question became a highly
controversial legal issue after members of the United States
Secret Service refused to answer questions presented in
depositions conducted by the OIC as part of a federal grand jury
investigation.8 In urging the trial court to adopt the protective
function privilege, the Secret Service outlined the nature and
scope of the proposed privilege.9
The Secret Service argued before the district court that the
proposed protective function privilege is an absolute that
prohibits the OIC from requiring testimony from Secret Service
agents and officers engaged in protective functions in physical
proximity to the president, if the testimony would have a
tendency to disclose the president's contemporaneous
activities. 10 The Secret Service believes that the protective
function privilege should apply to the agents' or officers'
observations of conduct, statements heard, and individual
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1996).
In re GrandJury Proceedings,1998 WL 272884 at *2.
See id. at*l.
See id.
See id.
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identities." Any agent or officer not performing a protective
function should not receive the benefit of the protective function
privilege, according to the Secret Service. 12 Furthermore, the
Secret Service takes the position that the protective function
privilege is not available when the agent or officer has
reasonable grounds to conclude that a felony has been, is being,
or will be committed. 13 The Secret Service concedes that the
protective function privilege might not survive when compelling
14
circumstances, such as national security, are implicated.
Since there are several important reasons for adopting a
protective function privilege for the Secret Service, I believe that
either a federal court or the United States Congress should
create a protective function privilege. This article includes a
discussion of the historical development of the Rule 501
privilege, relevant to the protective function analysis, and an
examination of the public policy issues of grand jury proceedings
and partisan politics which may be well-served by an
appropriate protective function rationale. I will discuss In re:
Sealed Case,15 where the In re Grand Jury Proceedings decision
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia,
with an analysis of why reasonable expectations of privacy for
the president, as a person, may justify establishing the
protective function privilege for the Secret Service.
My final comments will include a discussion of the appellate
court's analysis of the protective function privilege and conclude
that a protective function privilege rooted in privacy is
necessary.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. A HistoricalBias Against Expanding Testimonial Privileges
The Federal Rules of Evidence gave federal courts the
ability to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial
privileges in federal-criminal situations. 16 The evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges is "governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted ... in
11.
12.
13.
14.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

15.
16.

148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
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the light of reason and experience." 17 In enacting Rule 501,
Congress demonstrated a historical intent not to "freeze" the law
of privilege.' 8 Congress manifested a purpose to "provide the
courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a caseby-case basis." 19 Although courts have the ability to create new
privileges, courts are reluctant to do so because testimonial
privileges go against the fundamental belief that "the public...
has a right to every man's evidence." 20 Rule 501, in certain
circumstances, may grant a witness the privilege not to testify,
thus denying the public the right to a certain individual's
21
evidence.
Trial advocacy professor Edward J. Imwinkelried takes the
position that "the bias implicit in the other articles of the
Federal Rules strongly favoring the admission of relevant
evidence - compels the conclusion that the federal courts should
22
exercise great caution in announcing new privileges."
However, the bias in favor of reliable evidence "does not derive

17. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 501; Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934)).
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing 120 CONG. REc. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
20. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's notes at 3:
Article V as submitted to Congress contained thirteen Rules. Nine of those
Rules defined specific non-constitutional privileges which the federal courts
must recognize (i.e. required reports, lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient,
husband-wife, communications to clergyman, political vote, trade secrets,
secrets of state and other official information, and identity of informer).
Another Rule provided that only those privileges set forth in Article V or in
some other Act of Congress could be recognized by the federal courts. The
three remaining Rules addressed collateral problems as to waiver of privilege
by voluntary disclosure, privileged matter disclosed under compulsion or
without opportunity to claim privilege, comment upon or inference from a
claim of privilege, and jury instruction with regard thereto.
The committee amended Article V to eliminate all of the Court's specific
Rules on privileges. Instead, the Committee, through a single Rule, 501, left
the law of privileges in its present state and further provided that privileges
shall continue to be developed by the courts of the United States under a
uniform standard applicable both in civil and criminal cases. That standard,
derived from Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates the
application of the principles of the common law as interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. The words "person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof" were added by the
Committee to the lone term "witnesses" used in Rule 26 to make clear that, as
under present law, not only witnesses may have privileges.
22. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach To Privileges Under Federal
Rule Of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, The Expansive Antithesis, And The
Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 516 (1994) [hereinafter Imwinkelried].
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from the legislative history of Rule 501 itself."23 According to
Imwinkelried, this bias originates with friends of Rule 501,
Articles IV and VI through X.24 In University of Pennsylvania v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,25 the United
States Supreme Court stated that it was not inclined to exercise
26
its authority under Rule 501 in an expansive manner.
Imwinkelried states, "the Court did not cite any Rule 501
legislative history discouraging the courts from expansively
exercising Rule 501 powers. The point is that there is no such
27
history."
Professor Imwinkelried takes the position that the
legislative history does not support a restrictive view of applying
Rule 501. He supports the restrictive view of Rule 501 as the
right result based on a contextual analysis that there is a
28
substantive policy bias against fashioning any new privileges.
However, Imwinkelried's historical analysis of Rule 501 does not
provide any strong support for either an expansive or restrictive
view of Rule 501. He suggests that a moderate-restrictive view
is probably the right one to take because of the contextual
nature of Rule 501.29 From a historical-humanistic perspective,
the privilege concept is society's recognition of a legal right to
privacy and personal dignity for an individual facing scrutiny in
a legal matter. From this perspective, the humanistic value of
the individual supersedes society's interest in obtaining certain
evidence about a person who is involved in a legal proceeding.
In testimony during congressional hearings, constitutional law
professor Charles Black, a Sterling Professor Emeritus at Yale,
stated that privileges were designed to prevent the "invasion of

23. Id.
24. See id.
25. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
26. See id. at 189. See also Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 541.
27. Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 542.
28. See Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 542.
29. See Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 542-43, where Imwinkelried writes:
Construing Rule 501 in the context of the policy bias implicit in Articles IV and
VI through X, the federal courts should exercise caution in adjudicating
privilege claims. This cautionary note does not sound a death-knell for
privileges in general or even for novel privileges in particular. The most
fundamental common-law principle codified in Rule 501 is that the courts must
determine privilege claims by the method of balancing the loss of probative
evidence against the social value of the extrinsic policies fostered by the
privilege. That principle does not authorize, much less compel, the courts to
disregard or depreciate the extrinsic social values which are the raison d'ftre of
privileges.
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human privacy."30 I believe Professor Imwinkelried correctly
predicts that, in the long-term, the federal courts' ethical sense
of decency may shape the future of privileges. 31
B. Historical Tension Between Executive Privilege and
Testimonial Privileges
The Supreme Court has been authorized since 1934 to
32
declare by public declaration the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Until 1973, Congress routinely adopted proposed rules of
evidence submitted to it by the Advisory Committee. 33 In 1973,
however, Congress for the first time significantly modified rules
proposed by the Supreme Court. 34
Professor Imwinkelried
believes that the 1973 Congressional intervention with the
Supreme Court's proposed privilege rules was prompted by the
Watergate affair. 35 "The Watergate affair was just beginning to
unfold. The affair not only made Congress jealous of its
prerogatives; Congress found itself battling the President in the
federal courts over claims of executive privilege." 36 It is
interesting to note that a federal privilege not to testify in
judicial proceedings has been a right asserted by members of the
Executive Branch when confronted with the demand to testify in
30. Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 544 (citing Proposed Rules of Evidence:
Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the
House Com. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 555, 557 (1973)).
31. See Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 544. Imwinkelried quotes Professor
Charles Black's argument:
[S]ociety's ethical sense of "decency" necessitates the recognition of privileges.
In the long term, the federal courts' gauge of that sense may shape the future
of privileges. Relying, in the words of Rule 501, on their "reason" and
"experience," individual judges will have to assess the importance which
American society attaches to that extrinsic social value. That assessment will
enable the judge to adjust the Rule 501 balancing test to safeguard the freedom
of citizens from invasions of privacy.
32. See Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 512 (citing Federal Rules of Evidence:
Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
74, 76 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]).
33. See Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 512 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 46, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973)).
34. See Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 512. See also Senate Hearings, supra note
32, at 76; 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5421, at 652 (1980); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rule-Making
Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675, 682-85
(1975).

35.
36.

See Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 512.
Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 512 (citing 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET

A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 509-3 (1993); RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE
IN THE NINETIES 47 (3d ed. 1991)).
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a legal proceeding. During Watergate, the confrontation over
the right not to testify in a legal proceeding was between
37
Congress and the Executive Branch.
Twenty-five years later, the confrontation over the
protective function privilege not to testify in a legal proceeding
is, at one level, an intra-Executive Branch battle between the
OIC and the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury. 38 The
President did not invoke the protective function privilege on his
own behalf.39 Rather, Robert Rubin, the Secretary of the
Department of the Treasury, formally asserted the protective
function privilege.4 0 One could argue that the confrontation over
the protective function privilege is technically an intra-attorney
general battle. "When the OIC filed a motion in federal district
court to compel Secret Service testimony, the Secret Service,
through the attorney general, again asserted a protective
function privilege, which by that time had been officially
invoked by the Secretary of the Treasury, the cabinet officer who
oversees the Secret Service."4 1 In In re: Sealed Case, Judge
Silberman, in his concurring opinion, stated that under the
Ethics in Government Act 4 2 the Independent Counsel stands in
37. See Imwinkelried, supra note 22, at 512.
38. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *5 (D.D.C.
May 22, 1998).
39. See id.
40. See id. The court states:
While the court declines to recognize a protective function privilege, it must
note that even if so inclined, the privilege has not been properly invoked. The
president has not himself invoked the protective function privilege nor has he
instructed the witnesses to invoke it. Instead, Robert Rubin, the Secretary of
the Department of the Treasury, has formally asserted the privilege .... The
Director of the Secret Service states that he has not consulted with the
President or the White House on this issue .... Because there is no law on the
protective function privilege, the issue of who must assert the privilege is not
settled.
41. In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994), which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an independent counsel appointed
under this chapter shall have, with respect to all matters in such independent
counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction established under this chapter, full power
and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial
functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the attorney general, and
any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice, except that the
attorney general shall exercise direction or control as to those matters that
specifically require the attorney general's personal action under § 2516 of title
18.
See In re: Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J., concurring) for the
proposition that under the Ethics in Government Act, the Independent Counsel stands in
the place of the attorney general who represents the United States in any proceeding
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place of the attorney general and represents the United States
in any proceeding within his or her jurisdiction. The attorney
general filed a petition in this case without identifying, in the
caption, the party she was representing. On the first page of the
brief, however, she purports to represent the United States,
while the Independent Counsel's brief is also captioned as briefs
for the United States. 43 It is analytically impossible to have two
opposing lawyers before a federal appellate court representing
the same named party.4 It is a general rule of law that no party
45
may sue itself.
Judge Silberman took the position that, under the
legislative history of the Ethics in Government Act, no one but
the OIC could litigate for the United States government a
matter under investigation by the OIC without the OIC's
permission. 46 In United States v. Fernandez,47 the Fourth
Circuit held that Congress intended for the OIC to exercise its
ability to appeal a decision with independence from the attorney
general and the United States Department of Justice. 48 The
Ethics in Government Act limits the options that the attorney
general may legally pursue in a matter under investigation by
OIC. 49
Litigating against the OIC in this case as a
representative of the United States is simply not an option
50
available to the attorney general.
On appeal, it appears that the protective function privilege
is an interesting historical intra-attorney general battle with the
OIC fighting the Department of Justice. 51
The Justice
Department is not supposed to fight with the OIC over issues of
executive privilege. The Ethics in Government Act requires the
Justice Department to give assistance to the OIC. 52 From a
historical perspective, it is clear that the Executive Branch will
within its jurisdiction.
43. See In re: Sealed Case, 146 F.3d at 1031.
44. See id.
45. See id. See also United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426,
430 (1949).
46. See In re: Sealed Case, 146 F.3d at 1032.
47. 887 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1989).
48. See id. at 469.
49. See In re: Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
50. See id. "In pleadings before the Supreme Court the same day that our order
denying rehearing issued, the Department more forthrightly, if not more persuasively
named Secretary Rubin and the Director of the United States Secret Service as the
named parties." Id. at n.4.
51. See id. at 1033.
52. Id. at n.5. See also 28 U.S.C. § 594 (d)(1).
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not concede any of its asserted privileges not to testify without a
fight, whether the battle is with Congress or the OIC.
C. No FederalProtective FunctionHistory
In federal district court, the In re Grand Jury Proceedings
court concluded that there was no federal history of a protective
function privilege. 53 During oral argument, lawyers for the
Secret Service conceded that not a single court has recognized
the protective function privilege. 54 The trial court stated that
there was "no constitutional basis for recognizing [a] protective
function privilege," 55 and the Secret Service did not assert that a
56
constitutional basis does exist.
I believe that counsel for the Secret Service should have
asserted a constitutional right of privacy as a basis for the
protective function privilege. The President of the United States
should enjoy a general constitutional right to privacy in the
affairs of his private life. If so, recognition of the protective
function privilege as a basic privacy issue could therefore help
protect this general constitutional right of the president. The
protective function privilege would help to permit the president
to enjoy what former United States Supreme Court Justice
Louis D. Brandeis once described as "the right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
57
civilized men."
Under federal law, the President of the United States is
required to accept the protection of the Secret Service. 58 The
Congress compels the president to accept Secret Service
protection while remaining silent on the issue of an evidentiary

53. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *2 (D.D.C.
May 22, 1998).
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at n.1.
57. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis has been recognized for his contributions to the modern concept of the
right to privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis]. The right to privacy has
several meanings. This general constitutional right to privacy may have had its
inception with the article written by Warren and Brandeis. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 684 (3d ed. 1986).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1998). "Under the direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury, the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect the following persons:
(1) The President, the Vice President (or other officer next in the order of succession to
the Office of President), the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect."
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privilege for those protecting the president. 59 By requiring the
Secret Service to be near the president at all times, Congress
must have realized that Secret Service personnel would see the
President's conduct and hear his communications. 60 Even so,
Congress never created a protective function privilege while
requiring Secret Service members to be near the president. 6 1
The constitutional issue presented here is whether Congress
can, without a showing of a compelling state interest, deny the
president his constitutional right to privacy by requiring him to
accept the protection of the Secret Service? The answer to that
question is no, because Congress could protect the president's
limited constitutional right to privacy with an evidentiary
privilege while requiring him to accept the protection of the
Secret Service.
1. Least Intrusive Means Standardto ProtectPresidential
Privacy Interest
Congress may not impose the protection of the Secret
Service on the president's fundamental privacy interests without
meeting the least intrusive means standard required under the
compelling state interest test.62 The compelling state interest
test places the burden of proof on Congress to justify an invasion
into the president's fundamental privacy interest. 63 As in any
fundamental right-to-privacy case, Congress may meet its
burden by showing that the regulation serves the compelling
state interest of protecting the president by the least intrusive
means.6 4 However, Congress has failed to demonstrate that it
has used the least intrusive means in protecting the president's
privacy interest while achieving the state's overriding interest in
protecting the president. The least intrusive means component
of the compelling state interest test shows that there is a solid
constitutional basis for recognizing a protective function
privilege. Arguably, the least intrusive means of invading the
president's privacy interest, while requiring him to accept Secret
Service protection, is to grant the protective function privilege.
59. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *2 (D.D.C.
May 22, 1998).
60.

See id.

61. See id.
62. See generally Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547
(Fla. 1985).
63. See id.
64. See id.
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Under these circumstances, Congress, by not recognizing the
evidentiary privilege, fails to meet the compelling state interest
test. The compelling interest in protecting the president's life,
therefore, is constitutionally flawed because of this failure.
Federal law requires all executive branch personnel to
report criminal conduct by government officials to the attorney
general unless the attorney general grants an exception,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 535(b). 65 Secret Service employees are
executive branch personnel who are subject to 28 U.S.C. §
535(b), but also serve as law enforcement officers. 66 The
protective function privilege based on a right of privacy rationale
does not conflict with the Secret Service's law enforcement
obligations under the compelling state interest test.
2. Federal DistrictCourt Concludes There Is No Congressional
Intent For Protective FunctionPrivilege
According to the federal district court, § 535(b) as well as §
3056(a) indicate that Congress did not intend a protective
function privilege and, consequently, the intent of Congress is a
significant factor in rejecting new privileges. 67 The federal
district court was correct to conclude that Congress may create a
protective function privilege if it now believes one is
warranted. 68 Unlike the federal district court in In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, I believe that the court is not only free to
recognize an implied protective function privilege for the Secret
Service, but courts should be required to do so in order to protect
the president's fundamental right to privacy under the least
69
intrusive means standard of the compelling state interest test.
The right of privacy liberty guaranteed by the due process clause
gives an individual the right to enjoy those privileges long
recognized under the common law as essential to the pursuit of
70
happiness by free men.
65. The duty to report criminal conduct exists "unless ... as to any department or
agency of the Government, the attorney general directs otherwise with respect to a
specialized class of information, allegation or complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)(2) (1994).
66. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *2 (D.D.C.
May 22, 1998).
67. See id. See also University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805,
816 (1984).
68. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings,1998 WL 272884, at *2.
69. See generally Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547
(Fla. 1985).
70. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). In Meyer, the court held
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The constitutional right of privacy should not be denied to
the president when a less intrusive means of a testimonial
privilege for the Secret Service exists to allow the Secret Service
to protect the president without unnecessarily intruding on the
president's fundamental right to privacy.
The court, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, found that the
"protective function privilege has no history in federal law, but
history reveals that Secret Service agents testified in judicial
and non-judicial proceedings with respect to President Nixon's
taping system and John Hinckley's attempted assassination of
President Reagan." 71 The federal district court concluded that
the Secret Service's own history, the lack of constitutional or
statutory support for the protective function privilege, and
relevant cases under Federal Rules of Evidence 501, all weigh
against creating a new protective function privilege. 72
D. State History and the ProtectiveFunction Privilege
No state "has ever recognized a protective function privilege
or its equivalent." 73 The federal court, in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, stated "[t]he fact that every state has a governor in
need of protection and that no state has ever recognized a
protective function privilege provides a compelling reason for not
creating the new privilege." 74 Even so, the lack of state history
supporting a protective function privilege should not be
conclusive or compelling for not recognizing the new privilege
unless there is no less intrusive means of invading a governor or
75
president's right to constitutional privacy.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Public policy may be defined as "[t]he general principles by
76
which an organization is guided and managed."

unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English
in a public or private school.
71. In re Grand Jury Proceedings,1998 WL 272884, at *3.
72.
See id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See generally Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547.
76.

WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY 583 (1985).
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A. The Protective FunctionPrivilege May Help GrandJury
Proceedings
In addressing the public policy considerations set forth by
the Secret Service, the federal district court, in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, stated that it was of paramount national
importance to protect the physical safety of the President of the
United States. 77 The Secret Service told the trial court that
compelling its agents to testify before a grand jury about
observations made while protecting the president would violate
public policy, because current and future presidents would
distance themselves from its personnel, "thereby endangering
the life of the Chief Executive."7 8 The Secret Service asserted
that it provides the president with a "zone of protection at all
times" based on "complete and unquestioned proximity to the
President." 79 A compelled appearance by Secret Service officials
before a grand jury to testify about presidential activities puts at
risk their ability to have unquestioned proximity, which is
necessary for the president's safety.8 0 The trial court agreed
that physical proximity with Secret Service agents is necessary
for the president's safety.8 ' However, the court ultimately
rejected the Secret Service's argument that the fact that agents
could be compelled to testify before a grand jury will lead a
82
president to "push away" his protectors.
I advance the argument that the protective function
privilege should be created so as to give the president's
protectors a limited shield to withhold evidence from a grand
jury in a highly politically charged investigation. The general
public policy that should guide the presidency is respect both for
the law and a fair grand jury process.
When people act within the law, they do not ordinarily push
away those they trust or rely upon for fear that their actions will
be reported to a grand jury. It is not at all clear that a president
would push Secret Service protection away if he were acting
legally or even if he were engaged in personally embarrassing
acts. Such actions are extremely unlikely to become the subject

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *4.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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83

of a grand jury investigation.
It is indeed sound public policy for all people to be guided by
the principle of respect for law and justice. However, one can
act within the scope of the law and push away his protectors out
of fear of a perceived unfair grand jury process and or a biased
OIC.84
"The Secret Service is composed of public employees who are
law enforcement officers."8 5
As law enforcement officers,
members of the Secret Service may appreciate better than most
that the grand jury has abandoned its historical role of
protecting individuals from a suspect prosecution.8 6 It is quite
feasible a law-abiding president will not want his protectors to
testify before a grand jury because of his skeptical attitude
about the role of the modern grand jury. Some commentators
and courts have come to view a grand jury indictment as little
more than a rubber stamp of the prosecutor's decision.8 7 In
California, the state supreme court has strong reservations
about the role of the grand jury. "The prosecuting attorney is
typically in complete control of the total process in the grand
jury room; he calls the witness, interprets the evidence, states
and applies the law, and advises the grand jury on whether a
88
crime has been committed."

83. See id.
84. Judge Silberman wrote: "I am mindful of the terrible political pressures and
strains of conscience that bear upon senior political appointees of the Justice
Department when an Independent Counsel (or special prosecutor) is investigating the
President of the United States.
Those strains are surely exacerbated when the
President's agents declare 'war' on the Independent Counsel." In re: Sealed Case, 146
F.3d 1031, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J., concurring).
85. In re Grand Jury Proceedings,1998 WL 272884, at *5.
86. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). "Historically, this body has been
regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the
accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to
determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating
power or by malice and personal ill will." Id. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J.
CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES AND COMMENTARY 705-706 (5th ed.

1996) [hereinafter SALTZBURG & CAPRA] for a brief discussion of whether the grand jury
may still be regarded as a valid protection for citizen against the state.
87. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 86, at 705. See also Andrew D. Leipold,
Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260
(1995).
88. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 86, at 705 (citing Hawkins v. Superior Court,
586 P.2d 916 (Calif. 1976)). The discussion of the grand jury states:
The pervasive prosecutorial influence reflected in such statistics has led an
impressive array of commentators to endorse the sentiment expressed by
United States District Judge William J. Campbell, a former prosecutor:
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Public policy demands a protective function privilege for the
Secret Service when it is guarding the president, because the
Secret Service cannot be assured that the grand jury
investigation is any more than a rubber stamp of the
prosecutor's interpretation of the evidence.8 9 When people act
within the law they may ordinarily attempt to push away a
grand jury process they do not trust to observe its historical role
of protecting individuals from a perceived unfair prosecution. 90
Unlike the trial court in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, I do not
believe that granting the Secret Service the requested protective
function privilege conflicts with its duty to report criminal
activity under 28 U.S.C. § 535(b). 91 The protective function does
not prohibit Secret Service agents from reporting any criminal
activity they may observe or become aware of, it simply prevents
them from having to testify when they have no independent
92
reasonable knowledge of criminal activity by the president.
The protective function privilege would simply not apply when a
Secret Service agent has reasonable grounds to believe that
observed actions or overheard statements, at the time of
perception, were criminal acts. 93 The public policy argument in
favor of requiring the Secret Service to protect the president's

"Today, the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is
candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost
anything, before any grand jury." Judge William J. Campbell, Eliminate the
Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & Criminology 174 (1973). Another distinguished
federal jurist, Judge Marvin E. Frankel, put it this way: "The contemporary
grand jury investigates only those whom the prosecutor asks to be
investigated, and by and large indicts those whom the prosecutor wants to be
indicted." MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFrALs, THE GRAND JURY: AN
INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 100 (1977).
SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 86, at 706.
89. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 86, at 706.
90. See Wood, 370 U.S. at 390.
91. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *5 (D.D.C.
May 22, 1998). Under 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994):
Investigation of crimes involving Government officers and employees;
limitations: (b) Any information, allegation, or complaint received in a
department or agency of the executive branch of the Government relating to
violations of title 18 involving Government officers and employees shall be
expeditiously reported to the attorney general by the head of the department or
agency, unless-(1) the responsibility to perform an investigation with respect
thereto is specifically assigned otherwise by another provision of law; or (2) as
to any department or agency of the Government, the attorney general directs
otherwise with respect to a specified class of information, allegation, or
complaint.
92. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *1.
93. See id.
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physical safety, rather than become an unintended investigative
pawn of the OIC, supports the recognition of a new privacybased testimonial privilege.
The new testimonial privilege
would apply to those Secret Service agents who have no
reasonable basis to believe the president has engaged in any
criminal activity in their official presence. 94
Sound public policy favors granting the protective function
privilege to the Secret Service so that its agents will not have to
wonder, when testifying before a grand jury, whether the OIC is
actually investigating the man rather than the crime. In the
situation involving Monica Lewinsky, a former White House
Intern, and President Clinton, some have criticized Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr of investigating the man rather than the
crime. 95 Critics contend that Starr began investigating the
Lewinsky affair before asking for permission from the attorney
general and the Special Division.96 Without permission from
either the attorney general or a special division of the court,
Starr started his full-scale criminal case against Lewinsky in an
effort to get her to reveal details of any alleged sexual
relationship she may have had with President Clinton. 97 Some
commentators think Starr pulled a fast one in investigating the
Lewinsky affair by conducting the investigation prior to having
authority to conduct it and then using the unauthorized
evidence to get the authority to conduct the investigation. 98
Former Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh, who spent more
than seven years investigating the Iran-Contra affair, said that
Starr has overstepped his jurisdiction and his proper function as
an Independent Counsel by "investigating claims that arise out
of private civil actions and allegations of the President's private
life." 99
94. See id. In the federal district court the Secret Service argued that the
protective function privilege would not apply to a felony.
95. See Russel M. Sowcey, Note, The Tale Of The Omnipotent Prosecutor: How
Recent Events Expose Flaws In The Supreme Court's Analysis Of The Independent
Counsel Clause Of The Ethics In Government Act, 17 REV. LITIG. 611, 631-632 (1998)
[hereinafter Sowcey].
96. See id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) (1994): "An independent counsel may ask
the attorney general or the division of the court to refer to the independent counsel
matters related to the independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction, and the attorney
general or the division of the court, as the case may be, may refer such matters."
97. See Sowcey, supra note 95, at 632 (citing David Willman & Richard T. Cooper,
Clinton Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2391675 at *1).
98. See Sowcey, supra note 95, at 632.
99. See Sowcey, supra note 95, at 632. See also John Mintz & Toni Loly, Starr's
Probe Expansion Draws Support, Criticism,WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1998, available in WL
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One valid public policy reason why the Secret Service may
not want its agents to be compelled to testify before a grand jury
where the OIC is assisting the grand jury to interpret the
evidence presented against the president may be a perceived
lack of impartiality on the part of the OIC. "The perceived
independence of the [OIC] has come under attack. It is ironic,
yet inevitable, that the Act, which was written to solve the
public perception of justice achieved at highest levels ...is now
viewed as being invoked for partisan [political] reasons." 100
Some commentators have questioned the impartiality of federal
judges who appointed the OIC. 101
B. The Privilege Protects The Secret Service From Close
Proximity To PartisanPolitics
The Ethics in Government Act, designed to remove politics
from the criminal process, may have actually intensified the
politicization of investigation of the nation's highest-ranking
official, President Clinton. 102 This politicization may serve to
2463543, at *3; David Savage, Clinton Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 2391339.
100. Sowcey, supra note 95, at 637. In 1978, Congress passed the Ethics in
Government Act to avoid any perceived conflict of interest such as partisan politics. See
S. REP. No. 97-496, at 6 (1982). The report stated that "[t]he intent of the special
prosecutor provisions is not to impugn the integrity of the attorney general or
Department of Justice. Throughout our system of justice, safeguards exist against
actual or perceived conflicts of interest without reflecting adversity on the parties who
are subject to conflict."
101. See, e.g., Sowcey, supra note 95, at n.31. "There has been much discussion of
the actual impartiality of federal judges, and whether the actions of the Special Division
are non-partisan connections of the judges." Id. (citing Ryan M. Peter, Note, Counsels,
Councils and Lunch: PreventingAbuse Of The Power To Appoint Independent Counsels,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2537 (1996) (discussing a rather interesting lunch of Special Division
Judge David Sentelle with two conservative Republican Senators Lauch Faircloth and
Jesse Helms, just before the appointment of Kenneth Starr as the new Independent
Counsel. Both Faircloth and Helms had publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Robert
Fiske as an Independent Counsel and wanted him replaced by Kenneth Starr)).
102. See Sowcey, supra note 95, at 637. See also Nancy Mathis, Panel Studies
Impeachment Inquiry Today, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, October 5, 1998, at IA:
Amid escalating partisan rancor, the House Judiciary Committee today begins
steps toward a presidential impeachment inquiry, which its chairman hopes to
complete by the end of the year. But Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Ill., expressed doubts
Sunday that President Clinton will be removed from office, unless the
president's level of public support changes dramatically. The judiciary panel,
with 21 Republicans and 16 Democrats, opens debate today on whether to
begin an unlimited impeachment inquiry of Clinton, stemming from his efforts
to mislead people about his extramarital affair with former White House intern
Monica Lewinsky. The vote, a formality considering the Republicans' majority
membership, comes as the White House and Democrats accuse Republicans of
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defeat the role of the OIC in promoting public confidence in the
fairness and reliability of the results of the investigation of the
president. 1 3 It is sound public policy for the federal courts to
create a protective function privilege for the Secret Service when
it is protecting the physical safety of the president. This policy
is implemented in order to protect that agency from any
questioned proximity to the partisan politics between the
legislative and executive branches of government as well as
between the Democratic and Republican political parties. The
historical power struggles between Congress and the president,
as well as the Republicans and Democrats, have intensified
because of the OIC. 104 Some believe that investigations by the
OIC have been an important weapon to use against the
president. 10 5 The protective function privilege would serve the
public well by allowing the Secret Service to avoid being caught
up in these historical partisan conflicts and power struggles
between Congress and the president. This conflict often times
may manifest itself when an agent is compelled to appear before
a federal grand jury by an OIC that is not free of political
motives. 106
election-year partisanship. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr has accused
Clinton of perjury, obstruction of justice and abuse of office. Hyde said he
expects a vote along party lines by the committee for an unlimited
impeachment inquiry, despite efforts by Democrats to limit its scope and time.
The House is expected to endorse the panel's inquiry later this week.
103. See Sowcey, supra note 95, at 637. See also Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent
Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (1996).
104. See Sowcey, supra note 95, at 612.
105. See Sowcey, supra note 95, at 612. See also 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1994), originally
enacted as Pub. L. 95-521 (1978). The OIC was created by Congress to prosecute wrongs
by high-ranking federal officials.
106. See Bennett Roth & Gregg McDonald, Clinton Video Causes Quarrel, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Sept. 16, 1998, at 1. Roth & McDonald reported:
Partisan squabbling erupted in the House on Tuesday over Republican efforts
to release a videotape of President Clinton's grand jury testimony about his
affair with Monica Lewinsky. Before the House votes on proceeding with an
impeachment probe it must decide what evidence to release in addition to the
summary that was made public last week after independent counsel Kenneth
Starr delivered his report to Congress. The report contended that there is
credible evidence the president committed a number of impeachable offenses
from perjury to obstruction of justice. Republicans are pressing to release a
video of the president's August testimony in which Starr and his prosecutors
aggressively questioned Clinton on his relationship with Lewinsky. White
House official's fear Republicans will use the release of the video in campaign
commercials. Many Democrats believe it is wrong to make public piecemeal
parts of the supporting evidence submitted by Starr. They say the original
agreement called for the Judiciary Committee to review all of the material and
then selectively make public pertinent information. "If we proceed in leaking
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A. Facts
Certain officers of the Secret Service refused to answer
certain questions during depositions conducted by the OIC as
part of federal grand jury proceedings on the basis of an asserted
protective function privilege. 107 After the OIC filed a motion in
federal district court to compel the officers to testify, the Secret
Service, by way of the attorney general, again asserted a
protective function privilege.108 By the time the motion to
compel testimony was filed, the protective function privilege had
been officially invoked by the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Cabinet Officer who oversees the Secret Service. 10 9 The district
court rejected the asserted protective function privilege and
granted the motion to compel. 1 0 The district court's decision
was affirmed on appeal."'
B. Jurisdictionand Standard of Review
In order to receive appellate review of a district court's order
to testify, the witness must first disobey the order and be found
in contempt under the general rule. 1 2 There is an exception to
the general rule on appellate review when someone other than
the witness holds the privilege." 3 The non-witness holder may
and releasing documentation we will not have the dignified process this nation
deserves," said Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, D-Houston, a member of the Judiciary
Committee, which would hold any impeachment hearings. She also warned
"that we are about to begin a Salem witch hunt. I will not participate in a
witch hunt." Committee members have now had an opportunity to review the
tape of the president's testimony. Some said Tuesday that it would likely
prove a further embarrassment to the president because it shows him
"squirming" and "responding angrily" to graphic questions put to him about his
sexual tryst with Lewinsky.
107. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. "W]e affirm. We note at the outset, however, that the question before
the court today is whether the Secret Service officers can be compelled to testify before a
federal grand jury. We express no opinion about the propriety of asserting a protective
function in other legal proceedings." Id. In view of the appellate court's opinion it may
be a viable question as to whether the protective function privilege is available in a legal
proceeding called an Impeachment.
111.

See id.

112. See id. See also United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971).
113. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing In re Sealed
Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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appeal if "circumstances make it unlikely that [the witness]
would risk a contempt citation in order to allow immediate
114
review of a claim of privilege."
The court concluded that the witnesses in this case are
Secret Service agents who are also sworn law enforcement
officers and that it was highly unlikely they would disobey an
order to testify. 115 Since a private company may seek an
immediate appeal in order to stop an employee from testifying
as to matters protected by a privilege the company wants to use,
the Secretary of the Treasury may also seek an immediate
appeal in order to stop Secret Service agents testifying about
privileged matters that he has asserted on behalf of the United
States. 116 The court accepted jurisdiction over the protective
function privilege pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.117 Because
recognition of a testimonial privilege was a legal issue, the
8
appellate court review was de novo."
C. Asserted Rationale For The ProtectiveFunction Privilege
Should Have Been Rooted In Privacy
The Secret Service asserted that the protective function
privilege is necessary for it to carry out its statutory duty to
protect the president." 9 According to the Secret Service, the
privilege is necessary because it uses protective techniques the
effectiveness of which depends upon close physical proximity to
114. Id. "We have not hesitated to recognize that such circumstances exist when a
witness has sworn under oath that he or she will testify if ordered to do so ....In the
absence of such a sworn statement we are properly reluctant to conclude that we have
jurisdiction." Id.
115. See id.
116. See id. See also In re: Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 48 & n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
117. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), which
provides:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of
the Canal Zone, the District of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The
jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292 (c) and (d) and 1295 of
this title.
118. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075. It was stated in In re Bevill, Bresler
& Schulman Asset Management Co., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1986), "[a]lthough the
applicability of a privilege is a factual question, determining the scope of a privilege is a
question of law, subject to plenary review."
119. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1998). See
also supra note 57.
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the president. 120 The close physical proximity to the president
justification for the protective function privilege is not a very
good one. The physical proximity justification is not good
because it places the Secret Service agents officially protecting
the president in the awkward position of appearing to refuse to
testify in the context of a federal investigation or prosecution in
order to help cover up evidence of criminal misconduct of the
president. I believe the privacy rationale articulated by Warren
and Brandies more than one 100 years ago provides the
appropriate justification for the protective function privilege. 121
Political, social and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth grows to meet the
demands of society ....Gradually the scope of these legal rights
broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to
enjoy life-the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the
exercise of extensive civil privileges ....122

Congress, by requiring the president to submit to the close
physical proximity of the Secret Service in order to serve the
nation's compelling state interest in prohibiting and
discouraging presidential assassinations, has destroyed the
president's basic de facto civil privacy privilege to be let alone by
23
statute.1
Federal Courts and the United States Department of
Justice believe that the physical safety of the president of the
United States is an issue of national importance. 124 The
Department of Justice takes the position that presidential
assassinations are horrible tragedies, "devastating for the
country both emotionally and politically."1 25 The reality of our
contemporary national and international political, social and

120. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075. The Current Director of the Secret
Service states, "it is no exaggeration to say that the difference of even a few feet between

a President and his protective detail could mean the difference between life or death ....
In a letter to the Director dated April 18, 1998, former President George Bush succinctly
stated the case for recognizing the privilege: What's at stake here is the confidence of the
President in the discretion of the USSS. If that confidence evaporates the agents, denied
proximity, cannot properly protect the President." Id.
121. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57.
122. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 193. The "right to be let alone" language
was used by Judge Cooley many years before it was used by Warren & Brandeis. See
THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1998). See also supra note 58.
124. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *4 (D.D.C.

May 22, 1998).
125.

Id.
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economic situation demonstrates that the president should not
be let alone because physical proximity between Secret Service
officers and the president is necessary for the president's
protection. 126 However, in an effort to avoid presidential
assassinations, the president's privacy privilege to be let alone
has been eliminated by Congress through the Secret Service.
The Secret Service should be allowed to assert the right not to
be compelled to testify about the privacy aspects of the
president's life while officially observing him in close proximity.
One commentator has defined privacy as "control over who can
see us, hear us, touch us, smell us, and taste us, in sum, control
over who can sense us."'2 7
Under the above definition of privacy, the president has
little or no privacy independent of the Secret Service, because
the Secret Service exercises control over who can see, hear,
touch, smell, taste, and sense the president in those situations
involving close physical proximity to the president.
The
protective function privilege has its roots in one of the many
128
descriptions of the privacy concept.
According to Professor Ken Gormley, after more than 100
years it is possible to conclude that definitions of privacy have
clustered into four major categories. 129
First, many scholars including Roscoe Pound and Paul A.
Freund viewed privacy as an expression of one's personality or
personhood. 130 The protective function privilege will preclude
the Secret Service from being perceived as having to comment
on the president's personality. Because of the close proximity of
the Secret Service to the president 24-hours a day, any
126. See id. "The court does not doubt that physical proximity between Secret
Service personnel and the President is crucial to the President's safety." Id.
127. Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RuTGERS L. REV. 275, 280-81
(1974).
128. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 1335 (1992)
[hereinafter Gormley]. In this article, Professor Gormley argues that scholars have been
unable to agree upon a one-size-fits-all definition of legal privacy because it actually
consists of distinct species:
The Privacy of Warren & Brandeis (Tort Privacy)
Fourth Amendment Privacy
First Amendment Privacy
Fundamental Decision Privacy
State Constitutional Privacy.
129. See id. at 1337.
130. See id. See also Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343
(1915); Paul A. Freund, Address to the American Law Institute (May 23, 1975), quoted in
52 A.L.I. PRoC. 574-75 (1975).
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compelled testimony by Secret Service agents is likely to be
viewed by the general public as Secret Service agents defining
the president's essence as a human being.
In the second cluster, some scholars view privacy as
autonomy to protect the moral liberty of people to engage in
their own thoughts, actions and decisions. 131 The president's
self-autonomy is always compromised because the Secret Service
must maintain the ability to observe his actions at all times.
Because the president is not free to reject the Secret Service's
intrusion into his right of autonomy, the protective function
privilege should exist to respect the president's limited de facto
right of autonomy.
A third cluster characterized privacy as the ability to
regulate information about oneself with the goal of controlling
this relationship with other people. 132 The protective function
privilege would allow the Secret Service to control the
information about the president it deemed necessary in an
investigation by the OIC. One essential element of regulating
privacy-based information about the president is trust. In the
tradition of privacy, "[t]he Secret Service has a tradition and
33
culture of maintaining the confidences of its protectees."
A fourth cluster of scholars has broken privacy into three
essential elements of secrecy, anonymity and solitude. 3 4
Professor Gormley states that commentators have stumbled over
privacy because of a focus on privacy as a philosophical or moral
issue while ignoring privacy as a legal concept.' 35 I believe that
the privacy-based protective function privilege can be justified
1 36
as a legal, moral or philosophical necessity.
The appellate court states that unless otherwise prohibited,
131. See Gormley, supra note 128, at 1337. See also Louis Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425 (1974); Joel Feinberg Autonomy, Sovereignty,
and Privacy:Moral Ideas in the Constitution?,58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445 (1983).
132. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57. See also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 7 (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477-78 (1968); Hyman
Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35-36 (1967). "Privacy is the
condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life
which are personal to him is limited." Id. (emphasis omitted).
133. In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
134. Gormley, supra note 128, at 1338 (quoting Ruth Gavison, Privacy, 89 YALE L.J.
421, 433 (1980)).
135. Gormley, supranote 128, at 1339.
136. See Milton R. Kovitz, Privacyand the Law: A PhilosophicalPrelude, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 272 (1966) (discussing the nexus between the right of privacy and
theology); MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA, 82-85 (1949) (stating that

privacy has achieved universal recognition in all societies).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

23

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 60 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 6

Vol. 60

Federal Rules of Evidence 501 provides that the privilege of a
witness shall be governed by the common law in the light of
reason and experience. 137
A continued and evolutionary
development of testimonial privilege under common law
principles requires a court to recognize the protective function
privilege. That an individual shall have full privacy protection
138
in his or her person "is a principle as old as the common law."
An expansive reading of Rule 501 under the spirit of the
common law would have dictated the recognition of the
protective function privilege in order to protect the integrity of
the president's privacy as a person. Under the common law "it
has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the
exact nature of such [privacy] protection." 39 Unlike the United
States Supreme Court, it appears that the lower court views
Rule 501 as freezing or almost freezing the law governing the
privileges of witnesses in federal court. 140
Although the
Supreme Court has given a great deal of weight to federal and
state precedent when recognizing a privilege, the appellate court
correctly concludes that it does not regard the absence of
precedent as weighing heavily against the recognition of the
14 1
protective function privilege.
One reason the appellate court rejected the Secret Service's
argument was because protectors of state governors do not have
a protective function privilege. The court determined that this is
a significant factor in not recognizing the privilege at the
presidential level. 142 It was conceded by the court that analogies
can be drawn to state governors and their protectors; however,
the consequences of assassinations are so much greater at the
presidential level, the analogies provide little guidance for
demonstrating a lack of precedent for the protective function
privilege. 43 The protective function privilege was rejected, but

137.

FED. R. EVID. 501; see also supra note 4.

138. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 193.
139. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 193.
140. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996). Rule 501 "did not freeze the law
governing privileges ... in [our] history, but [Rule 501] directed federal courts ... to
continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges ." Id.
141. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998). "[T]he OIC makes
much of the lack of relevant federal or state precedent for the protective function
privilege. The lack of such precedent is hardly surprising, however, in view of the
novelty of the OIC's demand for testimony: This appears to be the first effort in U.S.
history to compel testimony by agents guarding the President." Id.
142. See id.
143.
See id.
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not because there was a lack of precedent for recognizing such a
privilege. 144
Judicial recognition of the privilege depends entirely upon
the Secret Service's ability to establish clearly and convincingly
both the need for and the efficacy of the proposed privilege. In
other words, the Secret Service must demonstrate that
recognition of the privilege in its proposed form will materially
enhance presidential security by lessening any tendency of the
president to "push away" his protectors in situations where
145
there is some risk to his safety.
Again, the argument that the protective function privilege is
needed because it will make it less likely that the president will
"push away" protectors in situations where there is some risk to
his safety is a flawed argument. The "push away" argument is
flawed because no rational president will knowingly materially
decrease his or her security in situations where there is some
increased risk to his or her safety.
I believe the protective function privilege is needed because
it will materially enhance presidential privacy and not place the
president's protectors at risk of destroying the president's
In
privacy in the absence of a compelling circumstance.
analyzing the appellate court decision it is my "purpose to
consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can
properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual." 4 6
The protective function privilege should be recognized by
the federal courts or created by Congress because when it comes
to the private right to enjoy life, the president is just an
individual. Warren and Brandeis were correct to conclude that
the right to privacy has come to mean the right to be let alone to
enjoy life. 147 However, unlike other individuals, the individual
who happens to be President of the United States, as the price of
public service, is denied the basic privacy right to enjoy a private
life. Unlike other individuals, the president may not be let alone
because he has a duty by operation of law to accept the
protection of the Secret Service. 148 Because federal law does not

144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 197.
147. See Warren & Brandeis, supranote 57, at 193.
148. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998). "[A]lthough we must
acknowledge that the Secret Service has a duty to protect the President, we must also
consider that the President has a correlative duty to accept protection." Id. at 1077. See
also 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a), (d) (1998).
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allow the president any privacy from his protectors, federal
courts should allow his protectors to protect his privacy from all
others, out of respect for the president's spiritual nature,
feelings and intellect in the absence of a compelling state
interest. According to Warren and Brandeis, the law has given a
recognition to man's spiritual nature, to his feelings, his intellect
as well as the right to be let alone. 149 After more than 100 years,
Warren and Brandeis' basic characterization of privacy as
simply the right to be alone is still valid. 150 The question we
may have forgotten to ask is what aspect of our lives involves
the right to be let alone. 15 1 In 1890, the right to be let alone
included the right not to disclose information to newspapers and
prying photographers. 152
For subsequent generations of
Americans the right to be let alone applies to a totally different
aspect of their lives. 53 The meaning of the right to be let alone
is dictated from generation to generation by history.154
In In re: Sealed Case, the appeals court stated that a party
trying to establish a new evidentiary privilege under Rule 501
must show with a high degree of clarity and certainty that the
proposed privilege will effectively promote a public good. 155 In
order to establish a new Rule 501 privilege, the Supreme Court
generally requires the proponent to come forward with an
156
empirical necessity for the privilege.
I believe that the Secret Service's ability to protect the
privacy of the president is a transcendent public good, which
justifies the protective function privilege.
Profound public
interest is served when the Secret Service is granted the
protective function privilege to protect the president's privacy
interest against unnecessary speculation and gossip. Gossip and
speculation are likely to follow any appearance by a Secret
149. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 193.
150. See Gormley, supra note 128, at 1342.
151. See Gormley, supra note 128, at 1342.
152. See Gormley, supra note 128, at 1342.
153. See Gormley, supra note 128, at 1342.
154. See Gormley, supra note 128, at 1340-41. "Since privacy is a creature of
American history, it is impossible to predict with any precision new permutations of this
right, any more than one can predict the events of American history itself." Id.
155. See In re: Sealed Case 148 F.3d at 1076. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S.
360, 373 (1980), where a proposed state legislative privilege was rejected as based on
speculation.
156. See In re: Sealed Case 148 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 693-94 n.32 (1972) (finding that "[e]stimates of the inhibiting effect of [grand jury]
subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make disclosure to newsmen are widely
divergent and to a great extent speculative")).
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Service agent before a grand jury.
Warren and Brandies argued more than 100 years ago that
privacy was needed to protect a person from gossip in the
press. 157
Under the circumstances surrounding the OIC
investigation of the president, the press is overstepping the
bounds of decency by printing gossip. 58 "To satisfy a prurient
taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily newspapers.' 5 9
The OIC, in fact,
acknowledges the profound public interest in the president's
physical safety. 160 I agree with the conclusions of Warren and
Brandies that an invasion upon a person's privacy may subject
him to mental pain and distress far greater than what can be
16 1
inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Since privacy violations in certain circumstances may cause
more harm than mere physical injury, I think I have shown with
compelling clarity under Rule 501 that failure to recognize the
proposed privilege will jeopardize the ability of the Secret
Service to effectively protect the president's privacy interest
against the mental pain and distress of gossip. "Each crop of
unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and,
in direct proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of
social standards and of morality.
Even gossip apparently
harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for
162
evil. It both belittles and perverts."

According to columnist William Shapiro, these days in
Washington, "the center of gossip can be found at lunch-time on
the strip of Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and
18th Street."163 At the Breadline sandwich shop, "harried White
House aides and hyperactive reporters" share the latest gossip
and predictions about Bill Clinton's fate because of the Monica
Lewinsky scandal. 164 At lunch at the Breadline, Shapiro and an
old friend who works at the White House quickly began to
engage in gossip about "what-did-you-know-and-when-did-you-

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
1998, at
164.

See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 196.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 196.
See Warren & Brandeis, supranote 57, at 196.
See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 196.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 196.
Walter Shapiro, The View From D.C. is too Close to Call, USA TODAY, Sept. 25,
2A_
Id.
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know-it fest featuring an ever-shifting cast." 165
The protective function privilege is needed to protect the
Secret Service from becoming victim of speculation and gossip
about why the OIC has subpoenaed its agents to testify before
the grand jury. It is my conclusion that those entrusted with
the responsibility for safeguarding the president are entitled to
a protective function privacy privilege based upon a realistic
appraisal of the danger and fears associated with the Secret
Service being identified with gossip and speculation about the
president's private life in the absence of a compelling
circumstance. There is a universal understanding in America
that this nation has a profound interest in the security of the
president. 166 It is now time for the courts to recognize that, as
between the Secret Service and the president, the nation has a
profound interest in protecting the president from mental pain
and suffering caused by gossip and speculation when the
president's protectors are compelled to testify before a grand
jury about the president's private affairs.
The rationale for the protective function privilege as
articulated by the Secret Service is weak also because the
president cannot know whether an agent realizes he is
witnessing the commission of a felony by the president. 167
Under the contemporaneously recognized felony exception to the
proposed Secret Service protective function privilege, the
president has an incentive to push away his protectors anytime
he or she perceives that his non-criminal conduct may be
perceived as a felony. 168 The president's privacy interest is not
above the law, but evidence of crimes committed by the
president must come from sources independent of Secret Service
agents, unless those agents recognized the conduct as criminal
when witnessing it. The protective function privilege based on
the privacy rationale is not designed to impede the search for
truth, but to promote limited privacy for the president as an
individual because he has no de facto privacy with the Secret
Service.
I believe prosecutors in future investigations of
presidents for evidence of crime, will have enough independent

165. Id.
166. See In re: Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
167. See id. at 1077.
168. See id. "An agent may not testify about the conduct of the President or anyone
else unless the agent recognizes that conduct as felonious when he is witnessing it; a
felony made apparent to the agent only by subsequent events-and any misdemeanor,
regardless of the circumstances-must remain secret." Id.
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sources to establish a case without impairing presidential
privacy by compelling Secret Service officers to testify before the
grand jury at the request of the OIC.
The court of appeals properly criticized the Secret Service
for not attempting to protect its articulated physical-safety,
close-proximity, protective function privilege rationale by
requiring agents to sign confidentiality agreements as a
condition of employment. 169 In order to protect the Secret
Service's interest in protecting the president's privacy interest, I
believe it is necessary for all Secret Service agents to sign
confidentiality agreements. 170 A protective function privilege
rooted in respect for presidential privacy will not be undermined
by being vested in the Secretary of the Treasury, and not in the
president, because a privacy based privilege unlike the safetybased privilege proposed by the Secret Service is designed to
influence the behavior of the president's protectors and
investigators rather than the president.' 7' The appellate court
correctly stated that the safety-based protective function
privilege does not reasonably advance its goal because a
president may distance himself from Secret Service agents when
engaging in wrongful conduct, as might a simple desire for
privacy at other times. 172 Under my proposed privacy-based
protective function privilege coupled with a required
confidentiality agreement, it will not be necessary or proper for a
president to distance him or herself from the protectors in the
name of privacy.
V. CONCLUSION

I agree with the appellate court's conclusion that the Secret
Service failed to meet its burden under Rule 501 of establishing
173
the need for a safety-based protective function privilege.
However, Rule 501 does allow for a privacy based protective

169. See id.
170. See id. "If preventing testimony is as critical to the success of its mission as
the Secret Service now claims, it seems anomalous, that the service has no better
mechanism in place to discourage former agents from revealing confidences or at least to
alert the Secretary when testimony is about to be given." Id.
171. See id. The appellate court concluded that efficacy of the safety based
protective function privilege "is undermined by its being vested in the Secretary of the
Treasury and not in the President, whose conduct the proposed privilege is supposed to
influence." Id.
172. See id at 1078.
173. See id. at 1079.
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function privilege based on the president's de facto right to be let
alone. Because the president does not have a legal right to be
let alone, it is necessary that Rule 501 be construed so as to
provide the president's protectors with the ability to assert the
president's privacy interest in order to promote the public good.
The protective function privilege based on a privacy interest in
the right to be let alone should be recognized in spite of the fact
that the value of the right to be let alone does not always lend
itself to useful empirical information. 174 The protective function
privilege is needed to insure the privacy of the president by
either congressional action or under a necessary and proper
common law reading of the goal of Rule 501.
The common law justification for a privacy based protective
function privilege is supported by the tradition of Warren and
Brandies, that all individuals including the president shall
175
benefit from a privacy principle as old as the common law.

174. See id. at 1078-79. See also Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2088
(1998) (stating that "[i]n an area where empirical information would be useful, it is scant
and inconclusive").
175. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 57, at 193.
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